Impact of government intervention in the housing market: evidence from the housing purchase restriction policy in China by Wu, Y. & Li, Y.
              
City, University of London Institutional Repository
Citation: Wu, Y. and Li, Y. (2018). Impact of government intervention in the housing 
market: evidence from the housing purchase restriction policy in China. Applied Economics, 
50(6), pp. 691-705. doi: 10.1080/00036846.2017.1340569 
This is the accepted version of the paper. 
This version of the publication may differ from the final published 
version. 
Permanent repository link:  http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/20422/
Link to published version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00036846.2017.1340569
Copyright and reuse: City Research Online aims to make research 
outputs of City, University of London available to a wider audience. 
Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright 
holders. URLs from City Research Online may be freely distributed and 
linked to.
City Research Online:            http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/            publications@city.ac.uk
City Research Online
1 
 
Impact of Government Intervention in the Housing Market: Evidence from the Housing 
Purchase Restriction Policy in China 
Yi Wu1 Yunong Li2 
JEL Classification: C33;E61; 018;R30;R50 
Abstract: In 2010, a housing purchase restriction policy was announced by China’s central 
government and implemented gradually by several prefecture governments. In this paper, we 
empirically investigate this policy’s effect on the housing market. Using a difference-in-difference 
(DID) framework, we show that the housing purchase restriction policy reduces housing prices and 
transaction amounts but does not influence the housing investment or construction markets. Moreover, 
upstream industry suffers more than downstream industry. The results are robust to a battery of 
robustness checks. Heterogeneity exists across cities. We find that first- and second-tier cities as well as 
highly urbanized cities experience great declines in housing prices after the policy’s implementation, 
especially cites that had high housing prices in 2010 and cities with high real estate investment as a 
proportion of fixed asset investment. However, the housing policy is less effective in curbing 
speculative demand.  
Key word: Housing Purchase Restriction Policy; Difference-in-Difference; Housing Market；China 
 
I Introduction 
Real estate is a pillar industry in China; it represented 12% of Gross Domestic Product in GDP 
during the period from 2005 to 2013 with the total construction and real estate industries being 
approximately $1166 billion U.S. (7229 billion RMB). Although it experienced a slight decline as the 
result of financial crisis, residential property investment accounts for approximately 19% of total fixed 
asset investment after 2011.3 Total residential loans issued by the four state-owned commercial banks 
grew to approximately U.S. $747.97 billion (4600 billion RMB) by the end of 2013 up from 
approximately $43 billion U.S. (355.6 billion RMB) in early 2000, with residential real estate mortgage 
loans estimated at U.S. $1463.41 billion (9000 billion RMB) up from $15.2 billion U.S. (126 billion 
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RMB) in 1999. 
Since the financial crisis, the growth rate of housing prices has averaged approximately 10% per 
annum (Deng, et al., 2015), and the trading volume has remained high during the period from 2009 to 
2010 (Zhang, et al., 2015) despite cooling in the housing markets of other developed countries. A few 
cities in China experienced a dramatic surge in housing prices. For example, real estate prices in 
Shanghai increased by over 150% between 2003 and 2010.4 Wu, Deng and Liu (2014) find a very high 
housing price appreciation rate in 35 cities bearing high risk. Meanwhile, according to the China 
Household Finance Survey, the average national vacancy rate climbed to 22.4%, implying the existence 
of speculation in the Chinese housing market. Booming housing prices and a rising vacancy rate caused 
concern that a housing bubble might exist in China, and a high price-to-income ratio indicates the 
underlying risk of social welfare loss as housing becomes increasingly unaffordable in some places, 
especially in eastern region markets, such as Beijing and Shanghai. However, even affordable units 
made available through inclusionary housing policies may increase housing prices (Hughen and Read, 
2014). Given looming social welfare losses, it became even more urgent for the Chinese government to 
implement restrictive measures on the purchase of real estate to effectively cool down the real estate 
market. The central government issued a series of intervention policies, such as a minimum down 
payment ratio and higher mortgage rates for a second home in early 2005, but the housing purchase 
restriction policy is the most stringent. This policy was announced by the central government in April 
2010, and it was then implemented by some but not all cities. This nature of implementation defines the 
treatment group as the cities which adopt housing purchase restriction policy, and the other cities 
become the control group. As the treatment and control groups are based on an exogenously defined 
eligibility rule, we have a window of opportunity to conduct difference-in-difference (DID) estimation 
to credibly identify the treatment effects of the housing purchase restriction policy on city residential 
housing markets. (See table for details of housing purchase policy) 
There have long been controversies about the role of government intervention in housing markets, 
especially housing policies (Allen and Carletti, 2013; Baldi, 2014; Cao et al., 2014; Crowe et al., 2013; 
Daniel and Hunt, 2014; Hui and Wang, 2014; Medrano and Spinelli, 2014; Wang et al., 2015; Wong et 
al., 2011). Theoretical models focus on government interventions in housing markets and their welfare 
implications (Gervais, 2002; Chambers et al., 2009; Cho and Francis, 2011; Sommer and Sullivan, 
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2013) by comparing steady states across policy regimes. In the short run, lending restrictions may 
disrupt untargeted housing markets, while having little influence on housing prices in the targeted 
market. However, when considering the transition between steady states, the effects of government 
interventions in the housing market may be large (Kirker, Stroebel and Floetotto, 2014). Further, in 
empirical settings, policies on the demand side, such as tax credits supporting house prices, take effect 
and increase trading volume over the short-run, while policies on the supply side, such as lending 
restrictions, have little influence on housing prices in the targeted market (Park. S, Bahng and Park, Y, 
2010). In China, most research focuses on the introduction and documentation of policies (Wang and 
Murie, 1999, Deng et al., 2011), understanding housing affordability (Cai and Lu, 2015; Yuan and  
Hamori, 2014), analyzing the unequal outcomes of housing reform (Logan et al., 2010), or studying 
how the market forces of supply and demand interact to create shortages, bubbles, and other market 
conditions (Hou, 2010; Hui & Shen, 2006).  
Unlike previous papers, this study provides new evidence on the effects of government 
intervention on housing prices, the housing transaction market, housing investment and the 
construction market and related upstream and downstream industries supported by a rare quasi-natural 
experiment—a 2010 housing purchase restriction policy announced by the Chinese central government 
and subsequently adopted by some cities. 
Although some Chinese scholars have explored this policy’s effects on the Beijing housing market 
from the perspective of resale and the rental market (Sun. et al., 2013) and the change in the correlation 
between price and volume (Zhang, et al., 2015), we consider its effect on the demand for and supply of 
housing and related upstream and downstream industries by employing data from 97 cities from 
January 2010 to December 2014. Our identification is essentially a difference-in-difference (DID) 
estimation: we compare housing prices, housing transaction volumes, housing investment and housing 
construction activities in restricted and unrestricted cities. First, we find that the housing purchase 
restriction policy has a negative and significant effect on housing prices. The results are the same using 
either the Newly Built Residential Housing Price Index or the Second-hand Residential Housing Price 
Index for 70 cities. This policy significantly influences the demand side, which is the housing 
transaction market (transaction amounts, transaction prices, transaction floors and sales amounts), but 
not the supply side, that is, the housing construction market (investment, floor under construction, floor 
started). Additionally, upstream industry suffers more than downstream industry. We also conduct a 
4 
 
battery of robustness checks, considering pre-treatment and policy lag effects as well as variation in the 
policy implementation date. Our baseline result is robust to these checks. We further consider 
heterogeneity among cities. Specifically, we study whether the policy’s effects are sensitive to a city’s 
tier, residential population, geographical location, level of urbanization, real estate investment or local 
governmental land reliance. We find that the development of the city’s real estate market rather than its 
size and location matters more for the effect of the housing policy. However, this policy is found to be 
less effective in the small-size and coastal city housing markets. We interpret these findings as evidence 
that the housing purchase restriction policy is not efficient in curbing speculative behavior.  
We contribute to the government intervention literature in the following areas. First, taking 
advantage of a quasi-natural experiment in the housing market, we identify the impact of a housing 
purchase restriction policy, which is the most rigid type of housing policy, on housing prices, demand, 
and supply as well as on related upstream and downstream industries by employing a 
difference-in-difference strategy. This allows us to identify the effect of the policy without being 
affected by city fixed effects or time fixed effects. Second, instead of deriving theoretical results, we 
use real data to check whether housing policy effectively influenced the housing market according to 
the government’s design. Third, we explore the most rigid government intervention policy in China and 
examine the housing market in detail, including the transaction market and the construction and related 
industries; this offers implications for other countries about the impact of government intervention in 
the real estate market. Fourth, the findings that the housing prices of first- and second-tier cities, cities 
with a high urbanization rate, or cities with high levels of real estate investment respond more 
significantly to the housing purchase restriction policy suggest that our results have broader 
implications for policymaking in other heated housing markets. 
This paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we briefly describe the details of the housing 
purchase restriction policy. Section 3 describes the empirical strategy and data sources. Section 4 
provides the results in terms of the housing price, transaction market, housing investment and 
construction market and the effects on both upstream and downstream industries. Section 5 presents the 
robustness checks. Section 6 assesses the policy’s effect on heterogeneous real estate markets. Section 
7 offers a discussion and concludes. 
 
II Background: The Housing Purchase Restriction Policy 
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The government in China frequently intervenes in the real estate market (Ahuja et al., 2010) to 
maintain welfare equality and social stability. The Chinese government implemented a series of 
restrictive measures beyond traditional monetary and fiscal policies to prevent a housing price boom. 
Such measures include increasing the down payment ratio, prohibiting a mortgage on the purchase of a 
second house, and imposing taxes on housing transactions. The housing purchase restriction policy 
announced in 2010 was directly adopted at the city level and aimed at house buyers. It is the most 
restrictive policy used to suppress demand and limit speculation in the housing market.  
The Chinese central government implemented the housing purchase restriction policy with the 
announcement of the “New National Ten Articles” in April 2010 as well as the “National Five Articles” 
in September 2010. The policy was adopted by a number of cities based on four criteria to guide the 
implementation of purchase restrictions devised by the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural 
Development. One criterion targeted cities in which residential prices climbed the fastest in 2010. 
Another two criteria addressed cities near provincial capitals as well as small cities that have had a low 
degree of compliance with past regulations and the real estate policies of their city governments. The 
final criterion applied to Tier 2 and Tier 3 cities mostly in coastal regions in which housing prices rose 
significantly in 2010. Provincial capitals and municipalities reporting directly to the central government 
should publish annual price control targets to keep new home costs “basically stable” as in the 
statement. Twenty local governments, such as Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou, issued specific 
execution plans in 2010 to curb their overheating real estate markets by imposing restrictions on 
purchasing power. Another 26 cities in total were to implement the housing purchase restriction policy 
in 2011.5 
According to the “New National Eight Articles” issued in April 2010, the general rule would be 
that only those with city hukou (household registration) or those who could prove that they had worked 
in the city for a certain number of consecutive years would be eligible to purchase property. Local city 
governments generally follow these rules to formulate their own regulations for home purchases. 
Effective proof requires either tax receipts or social security records for at least one year in most cities 
but at least five years in Beijing. However, there are no specific provisions on effective proof for 
citizens without hukou in twelve cities (Xiamen, Taiyuan, Haikou, Sanya, Jinan, Hefei, Zhoushan, 
Changsha, Lanzhou, Wulumuqi, Yinchuan, Huhehaote). Normally, citizens who have hukou can own a 
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maximum of two houses in their names, while those relying on effective proof in the city can buy only 
one house. This restriction is particularly severe in Beijing in that citizens with hukou can only buy a 
second house two years after they bought a first house. This is generally to restrict purchases of newly 
built homes, although some cities (Shanghai, Xi’an, Qingdao, Taiyuan, Nanjing, Hangzhou, Wenzhou, 
Zhoushan, Quzhou, Haerbin，Dalian, Wuhan, Nanning, Nanchang, Huhehaote, Chengdu, Kunming) 
also impose restrictions on purchasing a second-hand house. However, 15 municipal authorities (i.e., 
Fuzhou, Taiyuan, Zhengzhou, Kunming, Zhuhai, Tianjin, Jinan, Shijiazhuang, Taiyuan, Xuzhou, 
Ha’erbin, Shenyang, Guiyang, Chengdu, Kunming, Changsha, Yinchuan) proposed an alternative 
policy, restricting house purchases only in the administrative regions of these cities, where housing 
prices and crowding are highest, rather than in the entire city.  
According to statistical data from the National Bureau of Statistics of China, the Newly Built 
Residential Housing Price Index for 70 cities fell 6.5% by in 2011 and contracted further in the 
beginning of 2012. The trading volume of newly built residential housing decreased by 64 percent and 
that of second-hand housing decreased by 65 percent in Beijing. These changes demonstrate the effects 
of the housing purchase restriction policy.  
In summary, the housing purchase restriction policy had effects on the real estate market. We 
conduct a DID analysis focusing on the period from January 2010 to December 2014, which we will 
discuss in detail in the following sections.  
 
III Empirical Strategy 
Specification 
The housing purchase restriction policy (Xiangou Ling) was initiated by China’s central 
government in April 2010. A total of 46 cities in our sample implemented this policy. Table 8 lists the 
policy implementation status of all house restriction policies for 97 cities in our benchmark sample, and 
Figure 2 illustrates the location of the cities that implemented restrictions. Beijing was the first city to 
enforce housing purchase restrictions in May 2010, followed by Shenzhen, Shanghai, Xiamen, Ningbo, 
Fuzhou, Hangzhou, Nanjing, Tianjin, Haikou, Guangzhou, Sanya and Wenzhou in October. The other 
33 cities implemented the housing purchase restriction in succession. This quasi-natural experiment 
provides an opportunity to estimate the effectiveness of the purchase restriction policy in cooling down 
housing prices and its effects on the housing transaction, investment and construction markets in China.  
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 The 2010 housing restriction policy created variation among cities along two dimensions: first, 
dates before and after policy implementation; second, restricted and non-restricted cities. These 
variations allow us to conduct the empirical analysis using a DID framework. We compare the changes 
in housing prices of the restricted cities (treatment group) before and after the date of policy 
implementation with that of cities that did not implement the policy (control group). We first examine 
the average housing price among cities in both the treatment group and the control group. As shown in 
Figure 1, we find that the Newly Built Residential Housing Price Index of the cities in the treatment 
and control groups follow the same trend prior to the housing purchase restriction policy before 2010. 
We can see from Fig. 1 that the housing prices of the two groups diverge as those in the treatment 
group experience less growth in housing prices, presumably due to the housing purchase restriction 
policy, starting from approximately 2011. This gives us a first impression that the housing purchase 
restriction may effectively reduce housing prices in the treatment group cities, which is the first main 
result of our paper. 
We define a benchmark empirical equation using the logarithm of the average residential real 
estate price, ln( )itPrice , as the dependent variable. We include an interaction between the treatment 
and policy variables to estimate the policy’s effect on housing prices. The model specification is as 
follows: 
ln( ) ( )it i it t it itPrice Treatment Post trendα β τ ε= + ⋅ + + + ,     (1) 
where i  and t  refer to the city and month, respectively; iTreatment denotes the restricted 
cities, taking a value of 1 if the city was restricted and 0 otherwise; itPost  denotes the post-policy 
period, taking a value of 1 after the date of implementation for cities and 0 otherwise; iα is the city 
fixed effect, controlling for all time-invariant differences across cities; tτ  is the month fixed effect, 
controlling for all month shocks that are common to cities; ittrend is the city-specific linear time 
trend and we also include the quadratic time trend for robustness check ; and itε is the error term. β , 
the coefficient on the interaction term, is the main parameter of interest and measures the average 
treatment effect of the housing purchase restriction policy on housing prices after controlling for other 
confounding factors. 
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 To study the effects on housing transactions, housing investment, housing construction, and 
related industries, we replace ln( )itPrice  with variables such as housing transaction volume, 
housing sales revenue, among others. 
 
Identification Checks 
The first concern is expectations prior to implementation of the housing purchase policy, that is, 
whether homebuyers adjusted their behavior before the policy was implemented in their cities. This 
will complicate the estimation of the housing purchase restriction effect. We conduct a placebo test by 
including an additional control in the baseline model,  i ittreatment Month× , where itMonth  
equals 1 if the policy was implemented within three months and 0 otherwise, to examine whether 
housing prices began declining due to anticipation of the housing purchase restriction policy.  
Moreover, considering the timing of the policy, we assume that the policy takes effect in the 
month of the announcement date in our baseline estimation. In a robustness check, we adjust the month 
in which the policy takes effect for dates that fall in the last third of the month, and we consider the 
following month to represent when the restriction begins.  
A third concern may be about the comparability of our treatment and control groups. Because 
some cities in our treatment group implemented the provincial restriction policy in 2011, while others 
implemented it earlier in 20106, we can perform another test using cities that implemented this policy 
late in 2011 as the control group and cities that implemented this policy early in 2010 as the treatment 
group. The new control and treatment groups are more comparable, as cities from both groups adopted 
the policy and only differed in the timing of implementation. 
  
Data Source and Variables 
 We collect data from the WIND database, the National Bureau of Statistics of China, the China 
City Statistical Yearbook and the SouFuncom Website7. We focus on data for the residential market, as 
the primary purpose of the housing purchase restriction policy from the “New National Ten Articles” is 
to dampen the residential housing price surge. The average residential housing price data cover 97 
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cities8 from January 2010 to December 2014, while the Newly Built Residential Housing Price Index, 
Second-Hand Residential Housing Price index and Small-size Housing Price Index9 for 70 cities offer 
data from January 2006 to February 2015. To achieve consistency in the data, we adjust them into 
indices for the period January 2010 to December 2014 to avoid the structural break from the financial 
crisis in 2008. We also use several variables in the housing transaction market, specifically the 
transaction amount, transaction price, transaction floor and sales amount. Data are available for 19 
cities for the transaction floor, 10 cities for calculating the transaction amount, 16 cities for the 
transaction price, and 29 cities for the sales amount. Meanwhile, for the housing investment and 
construction markets, we have a sample of 29 cities for real estate investment and 23 cities for floor 
under construction and newly started. Considering the upstream and downstream industries, we use 
concrete prices as the proxies. We have a price for 32.5 concrete for 110 cities, a type that is mostly 
used in the housing renovations industry and for 42.5 concrete for 114 cities, a type that is an important 
input for housing construction. We use concrete prices as the proxies because concrete is usually 
locally supplied due to its high transportation cost, and thus, its price primarily reflects information 
about the local market.  We also include the disposable income, GDP, CPI and fixed asset investment 
for 70 cities as control variables in the empirical test. The variables and their descriptions are listed in 
Appendix Tables 9 and 10. 
 
IV Empirical Results 
Main Results 
 We first use the full sample of 97 cities. The results of our baseline DID specification for equation 
(1) are reported in Table 1. We first start with a simple DID specification, without controlling for fixed 
effects by cities or dates, in Column 1. After we control the city fixed effects and month fixed effects, 
our regressor of interest,  i ittreatment Post× , is statistically significant and negative, suggesting an 
Average Housing Price decrease in the cities with housing purchase restrictions. Column 3 includes 
controls for the linear time-trend of housing prices in these cities; this filters out the city-specific trend, 
                                                             
8 The 97 cities are randomized across China, which include the 46 constrained cities in the treatment group and 
other 51 cities in the control group. The nearly balance number of cities in treatment group and control group make 
our empirical results are more convincing. The average residential housing price data cover 97 cities has been 
deflated by inflation. 
9 A small-size house refers to a house with a living area of not more than 90 square meters, according to the 
definition of Chinese State Statistical Bureau. 
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which may confound the effect of the house purchase restrictions. The estimate on the interaction 
between the post-policy and treatment indicators is still negative and significant at a 1% level, which 
confirms the graphical results that the housing purchase restriction policy effectively reduced housing 
prices. Further, we include the quadratic time trend in column 4 for robustness check. It shows the 
consistent results.10 
 To confirm the results in Table 1, we replace the Real Average Residential Housing Price with the 
Newly Built Residential Housing Price Index in Column 1 of Table 2. We still find a significant and 
negative estimated effect for the policy. In Column 2 of Table 2, the restricted cities experienced a 1.51 
percentage point decrease in the Second-Hand Residential Housing Price Index after policy 
implementation, significant at a 1% level. This suggests that the policy also affects prices in the 
second-hand residential market and that the policy particularly dampens the demand for houses. The 
bone of contention regarding high housing prices is that those in the middle and lower classes cannot 
afford to buy homes, while the wealthy, regarded as speculators, benefit from the housing price surge. 
We next check the policy impact on small-size residential houses, which particularly reflect the demand 
for houses for ordinary residential use. The estimated coefficients in column 3 show a significant drop 
in the price index for small-size residential houses, but the effect is much smaller than the baseline 
result. We consider this smaller effect to be important evidence that the housing purchase restrictions 
did not dampen speculative demand much more than the demand for ordinary residential housing. 
We next examine the effect of the policy on the housing transaction market. The first three 
columns in Table 3 present the estimation results for the transaction amount, transaction price and 
transaction floor in the new residential housing market. The willingness of citizens to buy a new house 
has largely decreased with the implementation of the policy, as is clear from the negative coefficient of 
the interaction term. The housing purchase restriction policy directly led to a plunge in the transaction 
price and in the floor space sold of -6.53 percentage points and -11.41 percentage points, respectively, 
which are significant at the 1% and 10% levels. These changes contribute to decreasing sales volume. 
These results signal that demand in the housing market decreased after the housing purchase restriction 
policy. 
We further consider the reactions of the housing investment and construction markets to the 
                                                             
10 We also tried the cubic time trend and high order time trend, the main results are also the same as the linear time 
trend, so we only report results including the linear time trend in the following empirical findings. 
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housing purchase restriction policy. While the policy directly targets purchases of residential housing, 
the supply side may adjust as well. Given the significant number of non-occupied residential units in 
some cities, policymakers evidently also worry about surpluses of residential housing in some cities. 
They may welcome the housing purchase restriction policy if it also cools down the supply of 
residential housing. However, no significant impact on real estate investment is found, although its 
coefficient is negative. The results shown in Columns 2 and 3 of Table 4 imply that there is little 
evidence of a policy effect on the real estate construction market. Moreover, these findings are 
reinforced when we examine both upstream and downstream industries. In fact, the price of 32.5 
concrete, which is used for home renovations, significantly increased after the policy was implemented. 
However, the price of 42.5 concrete, which is used for house construction, decreased slightly. There is 
thus no evidence found that this policy slows either the supply of residential homes or its upstream and 
downstream industries. 
 
V Robustness 
In this subsection, we report results of a battery of robustness checks on the identifying 
assumptions of our aforementioned DID estimation. 
 
Placebo Test: Pre-policy Period 
In a placebo test, we address the effect of the policy on housing prices in the pre-policy period 
when there are other policies that will change the trend of housing prices. We include the interaction 
terms between policy implementation status and a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for the 1, 2, or 
3 months before the policy implementation and 0 otherwise. We find that the coefficients are not 
significant; if we found otherwise, that could indicate the existence of underlying confounding factors. 
As shown in Column 1 of Table 5, we find that housing prices did not decrease during the pre-policy 
period. 
 
Policy Lag Effect 
Our previous results are based on the premise that the local policies took effect in the same month 
as the announcements, even though some local governments made their announcements in the second 
half of the month. We consider the time lag of the policy effect. We take the exact date of the policy 
12 
 
and separate these cities into different groups. If the announcement date from the local government is 
before the middle of the month, the city is treated in that month. If the announcement date is after the 
middle of the month, we assume that the policy will take effect in the next month. We still find a robust 
result for  i ittreatment Post× , which is significantly negative. 
 
Variation in the Policy Implementation Date 
We consider different dates on which the housing policy is implemented across restricted cities, 
allowing us to implement another important robustness check. We separate the cities in the benchmark 
treatment group into two new treatment and control groups. The cities in the new treatment group are 
those in which the housing policy took effect before 2011, and the others are the cities in which the 
policy took effect after 2011 (control group). One important concern for the benchmark treatment and 
control groups is their comparability, as the restricted and non-restricted cities could be very different. 
However, the cities in our new treatment and control groups all adopted this policy and differed only in 
the date of implementation. The cities in these two groups are more comparable than the benchmark 
treatment and control groups. We still find significant a negative coefficient for the interaction term. 
 
VI Heterogeneous Effects  
 Our aforementioned analyses estimate the average effect of the housing policy on residential 
housing prices across cities. In this subsection, we investigate the heterogeneous effects of the housing 
policy by city geographic division, city size and city development status, as discussed in Section 2, to 
further elucidate how the housing purchase restriction policy affects housing prices. The policy to curb 
housing price increases is primarily targeted at first- and second-tier cities because most of these are 
capital cities. Further, the local governments in first- and second-tier cities were first to implement the 
policy after the central government announcement. Following these details, we add an interaction 
between our regressor of interest  i ittreatment Post× and the indicator variable iTier , which is 1 if 
the city is either a first- or second-tier city and 0 otherwise. Estimation results including the new 
interaction term are reported in Column 1 of Table 6. There is a negative and significant effect of the 
housing purchase policy on housing prices. This result suggests that much of the housing policy’s effect 
on first- and second- tier cities is in line with its original purpose. 
13 
 
 Next, we check whether the policy’s effect depends on the city’s location. Because house prices in 
coastal cities are more inflated by speculation than those in inland cities (Zhang, et al., 2015), the 
housing purchase restriction policy should have a greater effect on coastal cities, as it may curb 
investment motivated housing purchases. We create an interaction term,  i ittreatment Post× , and the 
geographic indicator iCoastal , which is equal to 1 if the city is on the coastal line and 0 otherwise. 
The regression result is reported in Column 2 of Table 6. The effect on cities in coastal regions is not 
larger than that in inland regions, which may imply that the policy is not effective in curbing 
speculative demand. Moreover, although the official documents clearly prescribe differential treatment 
of citizens with hukou, it is difficult to measure the real demand due to migration. Instead, we use the 
residential population to evaluate the real demand for housing in the city. We create an indicator 
variable for the residential population. If iPopulation  variable for cities is equal to 1, the residential 
population of cities is above the median of all cities from 2009 to 2014. Then, the interaction term 
 i ittreatment Post×  and the Changzhu population11 indicator iPopulation  yield the impact of 
the policy on high changzhu population areas. Column 3 of Table 6 indicates that housing prices in 
cities with larger changzhu populations did not decline significantly more than prices in cities with 
smaller changezhu populations.  
On the other hand, the development of the real estate market matters. The housing purchase 
restriction policy was implemented mostly in cities that had high housing prices in 2010, as discussed 
in section 2.12 We create an indicator variable for cities according to the rank of each city in 2010. 
iRank  equals 1 if the housing prices of these cities rank in the top 50 in 2010, and 0 otherwise. Then, 
we add a new interaction between our regressor of interest  i ittreatment Post×  and the indicator 
variable iRank . The regression results using the new interaction term are reported in Column 1 of 
                                                             
11 There are two kinds of population data in China, i.e. hukou population and changzhu population. The hukou 
population refers to people who registered with the police under the household registration system but does not 
include residents living in the city without local hukou, whereas the changzhu population refers to the resident 
population that has stayed in the same area for more than 6 months and reflects the migration pattern. For a coastal 
city where the manufacturing industry concentrates and hence becomes the residence of numerous migrants, the 
hukou population might underestimate the total number of residents. For an inland city that is the home of 
migrants, the hukou population might overestimate its total residents. To avoid this bias, we collect the data of 
changzhu population from the yearbooks of each city or province because changzhu population instead of hukou 
population represents the real potential demand for urban residential housing. 
12 We rank the cities according to their residential housing prices in 2010 and list the cities ranking in the top 100 
in the Appendix Table 11. 
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Table 7. The coefficient is negative and significant at a 1% level, implying that the effect of the housing 
purchase restriction policy on cities with high housing prices is larger than in cities with low housing 
prices. 
 The level of real estate investment in fixed asset investment is a key factor for evaluating the 
development of a regional real estate market as well as of the local economy. To consider variation in 
development among city real estate markets, we calculate the average percentage of real estate 
investment of fixed asset investment for each city during the year from 2010 to 2014. Next, we create 
an indicator variable iInvestment  to evaluate the importance of the real estate industry in the local 
economy for each city. If the iInvestment of a city equals 1, it means that its’ real estate investment 
is above the median value of the full sample and 0 otherwise. Then we obtain the new interaction 
between our regressor of interest  i ittreatment Post×  and the indicator variable iInvestment . We 
can conclude from the regression results in Column 2 of Table 7 that the policy effect in cities with 
active real estate investment is greater than that in cities with a lower ratio of real estate investment to 
fixed asset investment. 
 The urbanization process is the main factor increasing housing prices in Chinese cities. We 
construct an urbanization index for cities via principal component analysis13 to evaluate the level of 
urbanization. Then, we define the indicator variable for urbanization with an above the median value of 
the urbanization index. If the iUrbanization  of cities is equal to 1, the city has a high level of 
urbanization. Column 3 of Table 7 shows that the three-way interaction term is statistically significant, 
implying that cities with higher levels of urbanization are more affected by the policy than less 
urbanized cities.  
 Considering land sales appreciation to be a major non-tax fiscal income source for local 
governments, as discussed in section 2, we use local fiscal conditions to proxy for local government 
reliance on land revenue (Deng, et al., 2012). The local fiscal condition is calculated as the ratio 
between local budgetary fiscal expenditures and budgetary income in city i , and then, the mean value 
of the previous years is taken. The variable iDeficit  equals one if the local fiscal condition is above 
                                                             
13 The main factor involves the percentages of non-agricultural population and floating population of the total 
population, GDP per capita and percentage of GDP from tertiary industry of total GDP.  
15 
 
the median value of the full sample and 0 otherwise. Column 4 of Table 7 indicates that cities with a 
high reliance on land revenue do not experience greater declines in housing prices. 
 
VII Conclusions and Discussions 
Residential property accounts for the largest part of Chinese household 
investment—approximately 60% to 80%. Skyrocketing housing prices sow discontent among Chinese 
citizens. To efficiently control soaring housing prices, the Chinese government embarked upon a 
rigorous housing purchase restriction policy in October 2010, and this policy was subsequently 
implemented by 46 local governments. This paper evaluates the impact of the housing purchase 
restriction policy on housing prices, the housing transaction market, housing investment, the 
construction market, and related upstream and downstream industries in a DID framework. We first use 
a sample of 97 cities from January 2010 to December 2014 to obtain our baseline estimation of the 
policy’s effect on housing prices and then use the Newly Built Housing Price, Second-hand Housing 
Price and Small-size Housing Price indices for a sample of 70 cities to check the robustness of our 
results. A significant decrease in housing prices is found due to the housing purchase restriction policy. 
The number of transactions, transacted floor and sales, which reflect the level of activity in the housing 
market, decline approximately 4 percent to 12 percent after policy implementation. However, housing 
investment and construction are not influenced, which indicates that the potential housing price 
increasing in the future. Moreover, the price of 32.5 concrete, used as a proxy for downstream 
industries in the housing market, actually increases, while the price of 42.5 concrete as a proxy for 
upstream industries in the housing market decreases, although not significantly. Our result for housing 
prices passes a battery of robustness checks with respect to pre-treatment effects, policy lag issues, and 
variation in the policy implementation dates. Heterogeneity exists across cities. We find that first- and 
second-tier cities and highly urbanized cities experience greater declines in housing prices. The policy 
is also more effective in cities that had high housing prices in 2010, which is in line with the purpose of 
the policy. Cities that have high real estate investment as a portion of fixed asset investment are also 
more responsive to the housing purchase restriction.  
 This paper provides a comprehensive empirical analysis of the housing purchase restriction policy 
in China, which provides new evidence for the effects of government intervention in the housing 
market. Aside from housing prices, this paper broadens our understanding of the effects on the housing 
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transaction, housing investment and construction markets as well as on related upstream and 
downstream industries. 
Our findings that the housing purchase restriction policy significantly decreases both housing 
prices and housing transactions in China may have broader implications for policymaking in other 
countries, especially in developing countries that experience similarly skyrocketing housing prices. 
Demand for houses was more affected than was the supply of houses; however, there is little evidence 
that this policy is effective in controlling speculative demand. Moreover, the proportion of land sales 
through public auctions has positive effects on local GDP growth (Li, 2014). We should consider 
whether decreases in the land sale revenues after implementation of the housing purchase restriction 
policy result in the repeal of the policy. We will explore the details of the housing policy effects on 
local government behavior, which is beyond the scope of this study, in future work.  
 Obviously, the original purpose of the housing purchase restriction policy is to control excessive 
speculation in the housing market, which is pushing up housing prices. It is not sufficient to separate 
investors based on hukou registration alone; however, it is difficult to track investor behavior. We 
suggest the establishment of an online individual housing transaction record system, which may be 
more effective in monitoring and potentially limiting speculative behavior. We could then track each 
individual’s housing transactions and control short-term trading. A Web-based system, where the 
government put quantity restrictions on housing trading in a transparent system, will more effectively 
target speculative investors because houses trading at very high multiples of rent will lead to a negative 
shock in terms of policy intervention or further slowing of economic growth (Deng, et al., 2015). It is 
more efficient to improve housing market by increasing urbanization rate for cities at this stage rather 
than curbing housing price directly. Urban policy makers in China do not the need for deregulation but 
the need for policy coordination. 
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Fig.1 Trend in Newly Built Residential Housing Price Index from January 2006 to February 2015 
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Table 1 Baseline Model 
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Average Residential Housing Price (in log form)  
 
 i ittreatment Post×  0.4544*** -0.0157*** -0.0154***            
 
-0.0074** 
 
(0.0113) (0.0062) (0.0039) (0.0031) 
City Linear Trend 
  
Y Y 
City Quadratic Trend    Y 
City Fixed Effects 
 
Y Y Y 
Month Fixed Effects 
 
Y Y Y 
Observations 5,586 5,586 5,586 5586 
R-squared 0.2907 0.9744 0.9922 0.9958 
Note: Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2 Checks on the Identifying Assumptions 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variables: Newly Built 
Residential 
Housing Price 
Index 
Second-hand 
Residential 
Housing Price 
Index 
Small-size 
Residential 
Housing Price 
Index 
 i ittreatment Post×  
-0.0119*** 
(0.0015) 
-0.0151*** 
(0.0018) 
-0.0037** 
(0.0018) 
City Linear Trend Y Y Y 
City Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
Month Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
Observations 4340 4216 4204 
R-squared 0.9876 0.9831 0.9572 
Note: Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3  Residential Housing Transaction Market 
 (1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
Dependent variables: Amount Price Floor Sales 
Amount 
 i ittreatment Post×  
-0.1206 
(0.0986) 
-0.0653*** 
(0.0225) 
-0.1141* 
(0.0655) 
-0.0412 
(0.0340). 
City Linear Trend Y Y Y Y 
City Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Month Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Observations 560 892 1088 1403 
R-squared 0.9013 0.9790 0.8862 0.9725 
   Note: Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4  Residential Housing Construction Market 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variables: Real Estate 
Investment 
Floor Under 
Construction  
Floor Started  32.5 Concrete 
Price 
42.5 
Concrete 
Price 
 i ittreatment Post×  
-0.0412 
(0.0339) 
0.0175 
(0.1084) 
0.0381 
(0.2381) 
0.0898*** 
(0.0120) 
-0.0128 
(0.0113) 
City Linear Trend Y Y Y Y Y 
City Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Month Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 1403 1167 1379 5988 6415 
R-squared 0.9725 0.7659 0.5619 0.6927 0.7219 
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      Table 5  Robustness Checks 
 (1) (2) (3)  
 Dependent variable: 
Average Housing Price 
Placebo Test Policy Lag 
Effect  
Policy 
Implementation 
Variation 
 i ittreatment Post×  
-0.0133*** 
（0.0047） 
-0.0157*** 
(0.0042) 
-0.0242** 
(0.0145) 
 i ittreatment Month×  
0.0033 
(0.0083) 
  
 2i ittreatment Month×  
0.0030 
(0.0008) 
  
 3i ittreatment Month×  
0.0056 
(0.0084) 
  
City Linear Trend Y Y Y 
City Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
Month Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
Observations 5586 5586 2451 
R-squared 0.9922 0.9922 0.9933 
      Note: Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6 Heterogeneous Effects by City Location and City Size 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable: 
Average Housing Price 
First- and Second-tier 
Cities 
Coastal Cities Residential 
Population  
 i ittreatment Post×  
-0.0087 
(0.0054) 
-0.0135*** 
(0.0037) 
-0.0226*** 
(0.0038) 
  i it itreatment Post Tier× ×  -0.0143** 
(0.0070) 
  
  i it itreatment Post Coastal× ×   -0.0038 
(0.0063) 
 
  i it itreatment Post Population× ×    -0.0025 
(0.0036) 
City Linear Trend Y Y Y 
City Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
Month Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
Observations 5586 5586 4070 
R-squared 0.9922 0.9922 0.9931 
Note: Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7 Heterogeneous Effects by City Development  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable: 
Average Housing Price 
Housing Price 
in 2010 
Real Estate 
Investment  
Urbanization Local 
Government 
Deficit 
 i ittreatment Post×  
0.0464*** 
(0.0091) 
-0.0006 
(0.0070) 
-0.0004 
(0.0051) 
-0.0153*** 
(0.0040) 
  i it itreatment Post Rank× ×  -0.0833*** 
(0.0087) 
   
  i it itreatment Post Investment× ×   -0.0143** 
(0.0067) 
  
  i it itreatment Post Urbanization× ×    -0.0251*** 
(0.0070) 
 
  i it itreatment Post Deficit× ×     0.0039 
(0.0093) 
City Linear Trend Y Y Y Y 
City Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Month Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Observations 5586 2860 5301 5301 
R-squared 0.9924 0.9917 0.9937 0.9936 
Note: Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix: 
 
 
       Fig 2 Locations of Restricted Cities 
 
Table 8 Implementation of Housing Purchase Restriction Policies Across 97 Cities 
No City Starting Date No City Starting Date 
1 Anshan   50 Nanning 17-02-2011 
2 Baotou   51 Nantong  
3 Baoding   52 Ningbo 11-10-2010 
4 Baoji   53 Qinghuangdao  
5 Beihai   54 Qingdao 31-01-2011 
6 Beijing 30-04-2010 55 Quanzhou  
7 Changshu   56 Rizhao  
8 Changzhou   57 Sanya 17-10-2010 
9 Changchun  20-05-2011 58 Shantou  
10 Changsha  5-03-2011 59 Shaoxing  
11 Chengdu  16-02-2011 60 Shenzhen 02-10-2010 
12 Dalian  2-03-2011 61 Shenyang 02-03-2011 
13 Dezhou   62 Shijiazhuang 21-02-2011 
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14 Dongguan  63 Suzhou 03-03-2011 
15 Eerduosi  64 Suqian  
16 Foshan 19-03-2011 65 Taizhou  
17 Fuzhou 11-10-2010 66 Taizhou  
18 Ganzhou  67 Taiyuan 14-01-2011 
19 Guangzhou 15-10-2010 68 Tangshan  
20 Guilin  69 Tianjin 15-10-2010 
21 Guiyang 18-02-2011 70 Weihai  
22 Haerbin 27-02-2011 71 Tanfang  
23 Haikou 15-10-2010 72 Wenzhou 18-10-2010 
24 Handan  73 Wulumuqi 11-03-2011 
25 Hangzhou 12-10-2010 74 Wuxi 24-02-2011 
26 Heze  75 Wuhu  
27 Hefei 25-01-2011 76 Wujiang  
28 Hengshui  77 Wuhan 15-01-2011 
29 Huhehaote 14-04-2011 78 Xian 01-03-2011 
30 Huzhou  79 Xining 02-08-2011 
31 Huaian  80 Xiamen 08-10-2010 
32 Huizhou  81 Xiangtan  
33 Jinan 22-01-2011 82 Xinxiang  
34 Jiaxing  83 Xuzhou 01-05-2011 
35 Jiangmen  84 Yantai  
36 Jiangyin  85 Yangzhou  
37 Jinhua 23-07-2011 86 Yichang  
38 Kunming 19-01-2011 87 Yinchuan 24-02-2011 
39 Kunshan  88 Yingkou  
40 Lanzhou 07-03-2011 89 Zhanjiang  
41 Langfang  90 Zhangjiagang  
42 Lianyungang  91 Zhenjiang  
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43 Liaocheng  92 Zhengzhou 05-01-2011 
44 Liuzhou  93 Zhongshan  
45 Luoyang  94 Chongqing  
46 Maanshan  95 Zhuhai 01-11-2011 
47 Mianyang  96 Zhuzhou  
48 Nanchang 23-02-2011 97 Zibo  
49 Nanjing 13-10-2010    
Note: The exact date that the policy was implemented according to the formal public document from the natural resources and 
building management board rather than from media coverage. 
Table 9 Variables and Descriptions 
Variables Description 
Housing Market 
Average residential housing price: Real residential property price. Unit: RMB 
Newly Residential housing price index: Property price index: newly constructed residential property. Unit: 2010m1=100 
Second-hand residential housing price index: Property price index: secondary residential property. Unit: 2010m1=100 
Small-size residential housing price index: Property price index: the size of residential property is smaller than 90 square meters. 
Unit: 2010m1=100 
Housing Transaction Market 
Transaction amount: The transaction amount of residential property. Unit: billion RMB 
Transaction price: The transaction price of the residential property. Unit: RMB per square meter 
Transaction floor: The transaction floor of the residential property. Unit: ten thousand square meters 
Sales amount: Sales amount of newly constructed residential property. Unit: hundred million RMB 
Housing Investment and Construction Market 
Investment: Investment of residential property. Unit: hundred million 
Floor under construction: Floor space under construction. Unit: ten thousand square meters 
Floor started: Floor space started. Unit: ten thousand square meters 
32.5 Concrete price: Price of the 32.5 concrete for housing renovation. Unit: RMB per ton 
42.5 Concrete price: Price of the 42.5 concrete for housing construction. Unit: RMB per ton 
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Table 10  Summary Statistics of Variables 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Median 
Housing Market      
Average residential housing price 8057.094 4329.712 2787 33000 6834 
Newly built residential housing price index 141.577 18.733 106.343 213.859 138.321 
Second-hand residential housing price index 127.767 27.080 0.000 183.379 127.435 
Small-size residential housing price index 107.285 20.459 0.000 138.640 108.723 
Housing Transaction Market      
Transaction amount 76.974 64.639 1.498 411.140 63.300 
Transaction price 11000 6466.941 2441 30000 8589.500 
Transaction floor 61.222 47.013 0.000 240.520 50.590 
Sales amount 231.883 252.785 0.000 1561.130 138.239 
Housing Investment and Construction Market 
Investment 328.534 364.282 0.000 2301.980 194.450 
Floor under construction 2777.815 1791.637 0.000 8482.490 2324.240 
Floor started 189.494 1214.808 0.000 6535.900 204.620 
32.5 Concrete price 305.553 63.516 160 640 295 
42.5 Concrete price 349.005 69.536 180 715 335 
 
Table 11 City Rank Based on Housing Prices in 2010 
City Rank Average Residential Housing Price 
(RMB per square meter) 
Hangzhou 1 25840 
Beijing 2 22310 
Shanghai 3 19168 
Wenzhou 4 18854 
Sanya 5 18319 
Shenzhen 6 16978 
Ningbo 7 13438 
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Guangzhou 8 12560 
Nanjing 9 12016 
Zhoushan 10 10500 
Shaoxing 11 10105 
Zhuhai 12 9747 
Dalian 13 9678 
Xiamen 14 9660 
Suzhou 15 9103 
Taizhou 16 8967 
Qingdao 17 8962 
Tianjing 18 8958 
Nantong 19 8950 
Fuzhou 20 8666 
Huzhou 21 8220 
Haerbin 22 7939 
Wuxi 23 7843 
Foushan 24 7822 
Jinan 25 7760 
Quanzhou 26 7680 
Jiaxing 27 7587 
Haikou 28 7288 
Dongguan 29 7023 
Chengdu 30 6630 
Hefei 31 6255 
Er’erduosi 32 6220 
Wuhan 33 6196 
Nanning 34 6137 
Tangshan 35 6098 
Kunming 36 6006 
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Jinhua 37 6000 
Zhongshan 38 5988 
Yantai 39 5835 
Chongqing 40 5720 
Rizhao 41 5700 
Zhengzhou 42 5689 
Huizhou 43 5649 
Yichang 44 5637 
Taiyuan 45 5635 
Yangzhou 46 5630 
Nanchang 47 5573 
Changchun 48 5445 
Lanzhou 49 5440 
Xian 50 5398 
Weihai 51 5363 
Changsha 52 5339 
Changzhou 53 5302 
Jiangmen 54 5205 
Anshan 55 5150 
Qinghuangdao 56 5114 
Zhangzhou 57 5110 
Tai’an 58 5100 
Langfang 59 5090 
Zhenjiang 60 5052 
Chengde 61 5016 
Shenyang 62 4980 
Huhehaote 63 4920 
Shijiazhuang 64 4874 
Guilin 65 4865 
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Taizhou 66 4830 
Niuzhou 67 4822 
Daqing 68 4814 
Zhanjiang 69 4772 
Jiujiang 70 4771 
Yinchuan 71 4690 
Xuzhou 72 4632 
Lianyungang 73 4610 
Guiyang 74 4534 
Wulumuqi 75 4410 
Dongying 76 4370 
Shantou 77 4330 
Handan 78 4300 
Baotou 79 4225 
Luoyang 80 4207 
Yancheng 81 4150 
Yan’an 82 4135 
Jilin 83 4008 
Jining 84 3950 
Beihai 85 3890 
Kaifeng 86 3737 
Huludao 87 3719 
Weifang 88 3689 
Qiqi’haer 89 3671 
Qingyuan 90 3625 
Yingkou 91 3580 
Jingzhou 92 3550 
Xining 93 3440 
Xiangfan 94 3432 
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Lasa 95 3400 
Zibo 96 3300 
Dandong 97 3273 
Kashi 98 3250 
Zhangjiakou 99 3210 
Kelamayi 100 3200 
Data source: China City Statistical Yearbook in 2010 
